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ABSTRACT
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets the rules of
treaty interpretation in articles 31-33. Yet these rules are quite vague,
and they leave a lot of room for judicial discretion. The European
Court of Human Rights (“ECHR” or “the Court”) has developed its
own version of these rules of interpretation—a version that tracks the
three traditional approaches to treaty interpretation: the textual
approach, the subjective approach, and the teleological approach.
Looking at the practice of the ECHR through the lens of these three
traditional approaches highlights the logic of some of the court’s
interpretive choices, including its doctrine of deference: the Margin of
Appreciation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, scholars speak about three main approaches to
treaty interpretation: (1) the textual approach, suggesting that treaties
should be interpreted according to their language; (2) the subjective
approach, suggesting that treaties should be interpreted according to
the intentions of the state parties that signed them, and (3) the
teleological approach, suggesting that treaties should be interpreted
according to their object and purpose. 1 Scholars have contrasting views
about the relative importance and applicability of these approaches.
Some think a certain approach should be supreme. Others think that
different approaches should be applied in different situations. 2 What is
missing is an organizing theory to explain which approach should be
applied when.
Many may wonder if such a theory is at all necessary today after
articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“the
1. See Francis G. Jacobs, Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With Special
Reference to the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the Vienna Diplomatic
Conference, 18 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 318, 318–20 (1969).
2. See infra note 5.
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Vienna Convention”) created a comprehensive set of rules for treaty
interpretation. 3 But while these rules are accepted as customary
international law4 and certainly regulate many aspects of treaty
interpretation, they leave judges some room for discretion.
Specifically, the crux of these treaty provisions, articulated in article
31(1)—”A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in light of its object and purpose”—recalls elements of all
three approaches to treaty interpretation and necessitates a theory on
their interaction. 5 This Article demonstrates that the three traditional
approaches can explain much of the jurisprudence of the ECHR.
Moreover, this Article suggests that interpreting the Convention in this
manner is normatively legitimate.
The approaches presented above are methods of interpretation.
Interpretation is primarily needed when a judge has discretion on how
to construe a legal text. Indeed, many times the interpreter has a certain
amount of discretion on how to read the text of the treaty. Yet perhaps
in some situations no discretion exists at all. If the text of the treaty is
clear, then a judge tasked with interpreting the treaty should just apply
it. In other words, in some situations the textual approach simply directs
the judge to follow the treaty as it is written. The question then is: do
such cases actually exist? Are there cases in which the language of the
treaty is so clear that there is no interpretive discretion? Several
scholars argue that there are such cases. 6 To the extent that they are
right, any digression in these cases from the text of the treaty is done
without authority.
What if the text of the treaty is not completely clear? Does that
mean that the judge can interpret the treaty in any way she wants?
Certainly not. The judge is constrained to respect the wishes of the
3. See ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, THE INTERPRETATION OF ACTS AND RULES IN
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 309 (2008).
4. See VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 524–25 (Oliver
Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 2012).
5. See Alexander Orakhelashvili, Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in
the Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 529, 533–
35 (2003); Martin Ris, Treaty Interpretation and ICJ Recourse to Travaux Preparatoires:
Towards a Proposed Amendment of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 14 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 111, 118 (1991) (regarding the textual approach and
its limits); ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 3, at 343–44 (regarding the teleological approach);
EIRIK BJORGE, THE EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 1–3 (2014) (regarding the
intention of the parties).
6. See infra Part III.A.
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parties to the treaty. These parties are obligated to comply only with
commitments they consented to. The judge should then read the treaty
in light of the intentions of the parties that signed it, as the parties’
intentions represent what they willingly agreed to take upon
themselves. In other words, when the text is unclear, the judge follows
the subjective approach to treaty interpretation. 7
Yet a judge that does not follow the intention of the parties is not
acting without authority. The intention of the parties is clearly
something the court is committed to because states are only obligated
by commitments to which they consented. But the practice of the
ECHR indicates that it sometimes views the actions of states primarily
as a proxy for the interests and well-being of individuals that are
affected by these states’ actions. A way to make sense of the ECHR’s
jurisprudence is to claim that the court usually works under the
presumption that states represent the interests of their citizens. But this
presumption is rebuttable. It should be used in most of the cases, and it
should be replaced by another solution when there is good reason to
believe that a democratic failure prevents states from representing the
rights of the people at stake.
What is this other solution? It naturally refers the judge to the
teleological approach and directs her to interpret the treaty according
to the treaty’s object and purpose. 8 The purpose of the treaty ultimately
refers to more abstract principles that reflect the good of all mankind.
These principles underlie the ECHR’s common use of the principle of
effectiveness to justify so-called “expansive interpretation”—reading
into the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (the “Convention”) obligations that do not
strictly derive from the text. 9 Because humanity as a whole is the
ultimate source of authority for all international institutions 10 and is
even increasingly viewed today as motivating the principle of state
sovereignty, 11 this is the final stop for a judge faced with a text that is
not completely clear and with reason to suspect that the parties that

7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part V.
9. See Shai Dothan, In Defence of Expansive Interpretation in the European Court of
Human Rights, 3 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 508 (2014).
10. See ARMIN VON BOGDANDY & INGO VENZKE, IN WHOSE NAME? A PUBLIC LAW
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 210-13 (2014).
11. See Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 513, 514
(2009).
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negotiated it did not take the interests of all people involved into
account.
The Margin of Appreciation doctrine, which directs the ECHR to
defer to the practices of European states under some conditions, 12 could
be justified by reference to the same reasoning that justifies relying on
state consent. While the Margin of Appreciation is primarily a doctrine
of deference, it was also used as a tool that provides interpretive
guidance to international courts. As a method of interpretation, the
doctrine sets a certain “zone of legality” in which state actions are
protected from violation findings. 13 The doctrine could be justified by
respect to state sovereignty, just like state consent. This respect is
ultimately justified by the fact that states are the proper representatives
of their citizens. 14 Also, like state consent, the Margin of Appreciation
is unnecessary when the text of the treaty is clear, and it should be left
aside when there is good reason to believe that the state does not
represent the interests of its citizens. These solutions were suggested
by scholars 15 and were even claimed to be evident in the ECHR’s
judgments. 16 The analysis in this Article puts them in context by
connecting them to approaches to treaty interpretation.
Part I presents the ECHR and the unique methods of interpretation
it uses. Part II explains the limits of the text and explores situations in
which it does not leave any room for interpretive discretion. Part III
12. See infra Part II.B.4
13. See Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International
Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 909-10 (2006).
14. See id. at 920 (regarding deference by an international court, which is not elected, to
democratic decision making); Eva Brems, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the CaseLaw of the European Court of Human Rights, 56 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 240, 302-03 (1996)
(justifying the Margin of Appreciation by the principle of subsidiarity grounded in the idea that
national authorities and national courts are better able to balance the rights of citizens and public
interests).
15. See Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards,
31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843, 849 (1999) (arguing that the ECHR should not grant a Margin
of Appreciation to states regarding the rights of minorities to the extent that their rights are not
guaranteed by national courts)
16. See ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW: DEFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY 27-31 (2012); Andreas von Staden, The
Democratic Legitimacy of Judicial Review Beyond the State: Normative Subsidiarity and
Judicial Standards of Review, 10 INT’L J. CON. L. 1023, 1042 (2012) (arguing that the margin
of appreciation varies depending on the respect that should be given to state authorities); Oddný
Mjöll Arnardóttir, The Differences that Make a Difference: Recent Developments on the
Discrimination Grounds and the Margin of Appreciation Under Article 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 647, 664-65 (2014) (showing that the
social context determines the margin of appreciation given to states).
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investigates the principle of state consent, the justification for it, and
the situations in which it must retreat in light of higher-order
justifications. Part IV deals with the purpose of treaties. Part V applies
a similar analysis to the Margin of Appreciation. Part VI concludes.
II. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS
JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Court
The ECHR easily ranks as one of the most influential international
courts in history. Since its establishment in 1959, the court has issued
over 20,000 judgments 17 and processed about 800,000 different
applications, 18 most of which come from individuals claiming that their
Convention rights were violated. 19 The ECHR’s judgments had a
profound effect on the lives of 800 million Europeans under its
jurisdiction. 20 It also inspired the creation of other famous international
courts such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the
African Court on Human and People’s rights. 21 You can love the ECHR

17. See ECHR Overview 1959-2017, EUR. CT OF HUM. RTS. (Mar. 2018),
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Overview_19592017_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/UBG3VGG6].
18. See id. at 4.
19. There are three tracks in which cases reach the ECHR: (1) an application by a person,
a Non-Governmental Organization or a group of people that claim they are victims of a
Convention violation by a state under the court’s jurisdiction (the Convention art. 34); (2) an
application by a member state arguing that another member state committed a Convention
violation (the Convention, art. 33); (3) a request by the Committee of Ministers to issue an
advisory opinion about the interpretation of the Convention (the Convention, art. 47). Almost
all the cases reaching the court come through the first track—individual application. See
Dragoljub Popovic, Prevailing of Judicial Activism over Self-Restraint in the Jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 361, 372 (2009). The number of
applications grew rapidly over the ECHR’s history until it peaked in 2013 with 65,800
applications, the volume of applications has since slowly declined. See EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2016, at 7 (2017), available at
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2016_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZW9R6EG].
20. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer & Erik Voeten, International Courts as Agents of Legal
Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe, 68 INT. ORG. 77, 106 (2014) (demonstrating
how European states change their laws regarding LGBT rights to comply with the standards set
by the ECHR).
21. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE CONSCIENCE OF EUROPE: 50 YEARS
OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 16 (2010).
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or you can hate it, 22 but no one can afford to ignore it or its
jurisprudence. Its contribution to international law is immense.
The Court is tasked with interpreting the Convention, a document
that includes key human rights such as the right to life, 23 the right not
to be subject to torture, 24 the right to liberty, 25 and the right to a fair
trial. 26 The articles of the Convention are very broad and, sometimes,
ambiguous. This gives ECHR judges a large measure of interpretative
discretion.
Yet the ability of judges to use this discretion is not really
unlimited. If it wants its judgments to be complied with, the court must
be politically savvy. The ECHR does not have its own enforcement
mechanisms. It relies on an external body, the Committee of Ministers,
to enforce its judgments. 27 And even this body cannot really force
reluctant states to comply. 28 In order to encourage states to follow its
judgments and make a real difference, the ECHR has to behave
strategically. It has to avoid demanding from states more than they are
willing to offer. It has to avoid crossing states that could respond by

22. See, e.g., James Slack, Social Ties Keep Rapists in Britain, MAIL ON LINE (Sept. 21,
2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2039657/Akindoyin-Akinshipe-Social-tiesrapists-Britain.html [https://perma.cc/WNP5-DZJ4] (the opening words are “Another day,
another utterly perverse and sickening human rights ruling which is an affront to British
justice”). It was claimed that the Russians dislike the court so much that they even tried to poison
its former president Luzius Wildhaber. See Luke Harding, I was poisoned by the Russians,
human rights judge says, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2007/feb/01/russia.topstories3 [https://perma.cc/7FUE-FJ7F].
23. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
24. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 23, art. 3.
25. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 23, art. 5.
26. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 23, art. 6.
27. Article 46(2) of the Convention authorizes the Committee of Ministers to monitor the
execution of ECHR judgments. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 23, art. 46(2).
28. In the Statute of the Council of Europe (1949), Articles 3 and 8 give the Committee of
Ministers the power to remove a member state from the Council of Europe if it violates its
commitments to the Council of Europe. This extreme sanction, however, was never used. The
Committee of Ministers almost used this weapon of last resort against the Greek dictatorship in
1970, but Greece left the Council of Europe before it could be kicked out of it. See CLARE OVEY
& ROBIN WHITE, JACOBS AND WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 504
(4th ed., 2006).
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non-compliance or other initiatives that could damage the court, such
as amending the Convention to curb its power or cutting its budget. 29
The political dimension of judicial decision-making puts a real
constraint on ECHR judges. There are many other challenges they have
to deal with as well. The ECHR has forty-seven different judges, one
for every state in Europe. 30 The quality of these judges is far from even,
and allegations against the abilities of some of them are rife. 31 But such
practical challenges are not the concern of this Article. This Article
develops a normative argument: it tries to assess the legitimacy of
methods of interpretation used by the ECHR, viewed through the
perspective of the three traditional approaches to treaty interpretation.
B. Techniques of Interpretation
A major part of the contribution of the ECHR to the international
system comes from the jurisprudential techniques it employs. 32 Not all
the techniques used by the ECHR are original or distinctive to it, but
some of these techniques have been significantly refined and developed
by the court. To understand the way the ECHR employs the three
traditional approaches to treaty interpretation, it is first crucial to
explore its signature interpretive moves.
1. The Principle of Effectiveness
The Convention is a law-making treaty—it creates a regime that
should function for a very long stretch of time. The ECHR has often
stressed that, because of the law-making nature of the Convention, the
court will interpret the Convention in ways that make it an effective
29. In the past, I discussed at length the potential responses of states and the tactics the
ECHR can use against them. See generally Shai Dothan, Judicial Tactics in the European Court
of Human Rights, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 115 (2011); see also SHAI DOTHAN, REPUTATION AND
JUDICIAL TACTICS: A THEORY OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS (2015).
30. Each member state proposes a list of three candidates, out of which one permanent
judge is elected by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. See Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 23, arts. 20, 22.
31. See David Kosař, Selecting Strasburg Judges: A Critique, in SELECTING EUROPE’S
JUDGES: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE APPOINTMENT PROCEDURES TO THE EUROPEAN COURTS
120 (Michal Bobek ed., 2015) (arguing that some judges have such low qualifications that they
endanger the legitimacy of the court).
32. See Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based
Approach, 106 AMER. J. INT’L. L. 225, 246 (2012) (highlighting that international courts do not
just focus on compliance with their judgments; they are serving other general goals such as
supporting institutional and normative regimes).
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protection of human rights. 33 This ambitious goal is fulfilled in practice
by a series of interpretive choices that expand the obligations of
member states to more than what they agreed upon when they ratified
the Convention. 34
The techniques of so-called “expansive interpretation” are rich
and varied. Some judgments expanded the protection of a right
mentioned in the Convention to a much greater extent than what a
formalistic interpretation requires. An example is the case of Minelli v.
Switzerland. The case concerned a decision to repeal a defamation case
against a journalist solely because a limitation period had expired. The
national court decided that the journalist should pay two-thirds of the
court’s costs based on the assumption that if it was not for the limitation
period, the journalist would have clearly been convicted. While the
national court did not actually convict the defendant, the ECHR used
expansive interpretation to determine that there was a violation of
article 6(2) of the Convention, which protects the right to be presumed
innocent. 35
A more radical technique of expansive interpretation is creating
and protecting rights that are not mentioned in the Convention’s text at
all. In the case of Soering v. the United Kingdom, the court did exactly
that. The case prohibited the extradition of a person to the United States
because if he were extradited, he may be detained for years while he
expects a potential death sentence. The court ruled that this waiting
period would cause such a degree of anxiety that it would violate his
right not to be subjected to “torture or inhuman or degrading treatment
33. See Wemhoff v. Germany, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1968); Soering case, 161
Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. A) at 34 (1989); Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
90 (1978); Golder v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Comm’n H.R., App. No. 4451/70 (ser. B no. 16)
at par. 57 (1973); see DAVID J. HARRIS, MICHAEL O’BOYLE & COLIN WARBRICK, LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (1995); Franz Matscher, Methods of
Interpretation of the Convention, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 63, 66 (Ronald St. J. Macdonald Franz Matscher and Herbert Petzold eds. 1993). Paul
Mahoney, Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in the European Court of Human Rights:
Two Sides of the Same Coin, 11 HUM. R. L. J. 57, 64-65 (1990). However, while scholars argued
that the nature of treaties should affect their interpretation, the International Law Commission
deliberately did not distinguish between treaty types in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. See SIR ARTHUR WATTS, II THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 1949-1998, at
684 (1999).
34. See generally PIETER VAN DIJK & GODEFRIDUS J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 74-76 (3d ed. 1998); J.G.
MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 98-124 (2d ed 1993).
35. See Minelli v. Switzerland, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 62.
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or punishment,” which is protected by article 3 of the Convention.36
While article 3 does forbid such treatment and its definition can be
debated, the article itself says nothing about extraditing a person to
another state that may engage in conduct which is forbidden in the
Council of Europe.
The ECHR has used expansive interpretation also when it has
decided that states must provide practical safeguards to guarantee the
actual enjoyment of Convention rights. In the case of Airey v. Ireland,
for example, the court decided that an applicant who could not afford a
lawyer and could not properly represent herself before a national court
suffered a violation of her right to a fair trial, protected by article 6(1)
of the Convention. 37
Some judgments viewed articles of the Convention that were
designed to protect individuals from their state as articles that also form
positive obligations on the state. In the case of Marckx v. Belgium, the
court read into article 8 of the Convention, which protects the right to
private and family life, a positive requirement on the state to take the
necessary measures to ensure “illegitimate” children would have a
normal family life. 38
Furthermore, the ECHR sometimes required states to protect
people from individuals who might violate their Convention rights. The
case of X and Y v. Netherlands dealt with a mentally handicapped adult
who was raped, but the national laws prevented her father from filing a
suit in her name. The court decided that the state violated the
Convention because it did not legislate proper laws that would protect
the applicants from crimes committed by individuals. 39
In other judgments, the ECHR stressed that a state cannot avoid
responsibility for violations by requiring others to commit them instead
of committing them directly by state officials. 40

36. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. A) (1989), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57619 [https://perma.cc/D83C-93AH].
37. See Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 32. (1979),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57420 [https://perma.cc/EQK5-YV3K]. See also Artico v.
Italy, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1980), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57424
[https://perma.cc/3DXS-UDGF].
38. See Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57534 [https://perma.cc/9A2U-6RP4].
39. See X and Y v. the Netherlands, App. No 8979/80, Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 12 (1885).
40. See Van der Mussele v. Belgium, App. No 8919/80, Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 22 (1983).
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In addition, the ECHR decided to apply its jurisdiction
expansively, reaching out of the territories of member states. 41 It also
ruled that exceptions and derogations from the Convention must be
interpreted narrowly. 42 In recent judgments, the ECHR relaxed the
procedural limitations on non-victims lodging applications to the court,
allowing NGOs to bring cases on behalf of extremely vulnerable people
who have already passed away. 43
2. Evolutionary Interpretation
Law-making treaties should be allowed to evolve in order to
conform to current conditions. The ECHR has used so-called
“evolutionary interpretation” to transform the content of the
Convention into an effective protection of the rights enshrined in it
under changing circumstances. Usually, this implies a gradual increase
in the protection of human rights over time.
The case of Tyrer v. United Kingdom can serve as an example.44
The case concerned a fifteen-year-old boy who was subjected to
birching—a corporal punishment that was traditionally used within his
community in the Isle of Man. The ECHR stressed in this case that the
Convention should be viewed as a “living instrument” and should be
interpreted in light of current conditions across Europe. In view of the
development in the accepted standards of punishment in Europe, the
penalty of birching was considered a degrading punishment that

41. See Al-Skeini and others v. The United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99; Al-Jedda
v. The United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 July 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 305. The decision to expand
the court’s territorial jurisdiction came only after some back and forth in the court’s judgments.
In Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, the court decided
that it did not have jurisdiction in territories that are out of all member states of the Council of
Europe. Some scholars criticized this judgment as digressing from previous judgments that
applied the Convention to parts of Cyprus controlled by Turkey. See Case of Loizidou v. Turkey,
Preliminary Objections, App. No. 15318/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1995); Case of Loizidou v. Turkey,
Merits, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2234-35, ¶ 52. A potential explanation for the court’s hesitation
to apply jurisdiction in Bankovic, before shifting to the new expansive doctrine in Al-Skeini and
Al-Jedda, is that Yugoslavia was never under the court’s jurisdiction while Cyprus was under
the court’s jurisdiction before falling under Turkish rule. This sophisticated explanation was
criticized by some scholars. See Alexandra Ruth & Mirja Trilsch, Bankovic v. Belgium
(Admissibility), 97 AM. J. INT’L L 168, 172 (2003).
42. See Case of Klass and Others v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 1, 31
(1978).
43. See CLR v. Romania, 2014-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; see also Shai Dothan, Luring NGOs to
International Courts: A Comment on CLR v. Romania, 75 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 635 (2015).
44. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 26 (1978).
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violates article 3 of the Convention. 45 The Emerging Consensus
doctrine, discussed below, is often used by the ECHR to determine how
the interpretation of the Convention should evolve to keep track of
changing conditions in Europe.
3. Emerging Consensus
According to the Emerging Consensus doctrine, the ECHR should
consider current views as it interprets the Convention. There was some
divergence on the question of whose views matter in this respect in the
ECHR’s jurisprudence. Three different understandings of the
Emerging Consensus doctrine crystalized in the court’s judgments: (1)
the doctrine directs the ECHR to follow the laws of states in Europe;
(2) the doctrine requires the ECHR to consider the views of experts;
and (3) the doctrine obligates the ECHR to consider the views of the
European public. 46
Recent ECHR judgments suggest that the ECHR settled on a
single interpretation of the Emerging Consensus doctrine, which it
applies in many of its judgments. According to the current use of the
Emerging Consensus doctrine, the ECHR will check if a majority of
the states in Europe protect a certain human right, if they do, the ECHR
will read the Convention as protecting that right and will find states that
infringe this right in violation of the Convention. 47 In essence,
Emerging Consensus is used by the ECHR to gradually improve the
human rights standards in Europe. Whenever a majority of states
protect a certain right, the court defines this practice as the new minimal
standard of protection and requires all states to grant the same
protection or more.
A powerful example of the use of Emerging Consensus to enhance
the protection of human rights over time is the series of judgments
addressing the protection of transsexuals’ rights in the United
Kingdom. In the Rees case, decided in 1986, the ECHR ruled that
keeping the former sex of transsexuals in their birth certificate and
45. Id. at ¶ 31, 35.
46. See Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on
Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 133, 139-40 (1993).
47. See Helfer & Voeten, supra note 20, at 106; KANSTANTSIN DZEHTSIAROU, EUROPEAN
CONSENSUS AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 12, 37 (2015)
(claiming that the ECHR will declare an Emerging Consensus even if a right is not universally
protected in Europe. It is enough that a significant majority protects this right and the European
trend seems to be in favour of protection).
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preventing them from marrying a person of their opposite current sex
did not violate the Convention. 48 The court observed at the time that
there was no consensus in Europe about granting greater protection to
transsexuals, as was done in only some states. 49 In contrast, after the
laws of several European states changed in favor of transsexuals’
rights, the ECHR reconsidered that decision. In the Sheffield and
Horsham case, the court indicated that only four out of thirty-seven
examined states in Europe prevented transsexuals from changing their
sex registration in their birth certificate. 50 This was a warning to the
United Kingdom that the European consensus was changing. In 2002,
in the Goodwin case, the court reversed its previous judgments and
found the United Kingdom in violation of the Convention, noting that
the Emerging Consensus in Europe changed together with a broader
international trend toward greater protection of transsexuals’ rights. 51
But what would happen if the European trend would shift against
protecting certain human rights instead of for protecting them? Some
scholars are concerned that Emerging Consensus would in that case
lead to a downturn in the protection of human rights. 52 However,
scholars who studied the actual application of Emerging Consensus by
the ECHR claim that it is regularly used to protect human rights and
minority rights. When the European trend calls for limiting the
protection of these rights, judges use their discretion and decide not to
apply the Emerging Consensus doctrine. 53
4. Margin of Appreciation
The Margin of Appreciation doctrine regulates the exercise of
judicial deference by the ECHR. Essentially, the doctrine sets the
leeway that is given to states to adopt policies that digress from what
the ECHR decides is the correct interpretation of the Convention. One
way to understand this leeway is as preventing the ECHR from
intervening in the discretion of states. Another way is to understand it
48. Rees v. United Kingdom, 2/1985/88/135, Eur.. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 106 (1986).
49. Id. at ¶ 37.
50. Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom, 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011, 2029.
51. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 at ¶¶ 84-85.
52. See Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113, 14647 (2005); Paolo G. Carozza, Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law in International Human
Rights: Some Reflections on the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 73
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1217, 1231 (1998).
53. See DZEHTSIAROU, supra note 47, at 122-29.
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as suggesting that the Convention itself includes a spectrum of
legitimate legal possibilities from which the states are free to choose.54
The amount of deference given to states is determined by the
width of the Margin of Appreciation. The wider the Margin of
Appreciation, the lower the chance that the ECHR will find a violation.
The narrower the Margin of Appreciation, the greater the ability of the
ECHR to find a violation in state practice.
The width of the Margin of Appreciation depends on several
factors, including the rights that were infringed, the interests served by
the infringement, and the purpose of the infringement. 55 When the
infringement concerns an especially vital part of a person’s identity, the
Margin of Appreciation will be narrower. 56 When a right is infringed
to support a policy grounded in deeply-ingrained moral beliefs, the
Margin of appreciation will be wider. 57 Furthermore, the Margin of
Appreciation doctrine competes with the Emerging Consensus
doctrine. When there is no European consensus on a matter of policy,
the Margin of Appreciation will be wider. 58 When there is a clear
European consensus, the Margin of Appreciation will be narrower. 59
The main justification for granting states a Margin of
Appreciation is that European states make their decisions through a
legitimate democratic process that deserves the respect of the ECHR,
an unelected international body. 60 The principle that international
intervention in the decisions of democratic bodies should be limited is
known as “the principle of subsidiarity.” 61
This Article casts a doubt on the validity of some democratic
processes within states and calls for different degrees of deference in
certain situations where democratic failures are suspected. That is a
solution that was advocated by scholars and even observed in some

54. See Shany, supra note 13, at 909-10.
55. See Judge Dean Spielmann, Allowing the Right Margin the European Court of Human
Rights and the National Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European
Review? CELS Working Paper Series, at pp. 9-23.
56. See Dickson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44362/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶¶ 77-78 (2007).
57. See A, B, and C v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 233 (2010).
58. See Evans v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6339/05, 2006 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 77.
59. See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 316-17 (1997).
60. See Shany, supra note 13, at 918-22 (listing this and several other justifications for the
Margin of Appreciation doctrine).
61. See Shai Dothan, Margin of Appreciation and Democracy: Human Rights and
Deference to Political Bodies, 9 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 145, 146 (2018).
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ECHR judgments. 62 But other recent ECHR judgments suggested
another, more precise solution to the same problem. Scholars have
argued that the ECHR has started to examine the actual decisionmaking processes within states and to grant a wider Margin of
Appreciation when these processes are commendable and a narrower
Margin of Appreciation when they are flawed. 63
III. THE LIMITS OF THE TEXT
A. Are There Easy Cases in International Law?
Legal interpretation usually involves a measure of discretion.
American Legal Realism suggests three separate reasons for this
discretion: (1) legal rules are indeterminate—they do not point to just
one legal solution because they use ambiguous language and because
all future situations cannot be foreseen and addressed by the text; 64 (2)
there are usually multiple conflicting rules pertaining to the same legal
problem; 65 and (3) in order to apply a rule to a factual situation, facts
must be constructed according to legal categories. Since facts are
amenable to several possible classifications, this act involves judicial
discretion. 66
International law is different from domestic law because it harbors
no illusions that legal rules eventually come together to form a
harmonious system. Instead, in international law there are not only
conflicting rules, but rather rules that are motivated by contradictory
goals. 67 Therefore, some scholars argue that even if there is one clear
international rule that pertains to a certain fact, that rule is based on
reasons that conflict with one another. 68 Because relying on the rule,
62. See supra notes 15-16.
63. See Robert Spano, Universality or Diversity of Human Rights: Strasburg in the Age of
Subsidiarity, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 487, 498-99 (2014); Mikael Rask Madsen, Rebalancing
European Human Rights: Has the Brighton Declaration Engendered a New Deal on Human
Rights in Europe, 9 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 199, 203, 214 (2018); Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir,
The Brighton Aftermath and the Changing Role of the European Court of Human Rights, 9 J.
INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 223, 234 (2018).
64. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-26 (1961).
65. See Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 261, 266 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996); Hanoch Dagan, The Realist Conception
of Law, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607, 614-15 (2007).
66. See Leiter, supra note 65, at 266-67; Dagan, supra note 65, at 616.
67. See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 590-91 (2005).
68. Id.
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they claim, is never preferable to relying on any of its opposing reasons,
any interpretation is legally defensible. 69
Other scholars, in contrast, insist that some legal arguments
cannot be defended. The law is sometimes clear and leaves no room for
judicial discretion. 70 These cases are often called “easy cases.” In fact,
most legal texts are easy cases. They never reach the courts because
their meaning is clear. Courts usually deal with more complex cases in
which reasonable parties can disagree about interpretation. 71 Easy
cases also occur in international law, as some treaties are just as clear
as domestic statutes. 72
When judges face easy cases in international law, they are forced
to use the textual approach—they simply apply the text of the treaty.
Another way to look at it, semantically different but with the same
normative implications, is to say that easy cases are cases that do not
require the use of interpretive tools at all. While one can dispute
whether clear texts require some form of interpretation, 73 it is evident
that the Vienna Convention assumes the existence of cases that do not
require interpretation of any kind. The conception that clear cases do
not require interpretation, known as the “clear meaning doctrine”, is
reflected in the phrasing of articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention. 74

69. Id.
70. See BJORGE, supra note 5, at 21-22.
71. AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 58-66 (1987) (Hebrew).
72. A good example is the number of permanent judges at the International Court of Justice
(fifteen, according to article 3(1) of the court’s statute). See BJORGE, supra note 5, at 21.
73. One may argue that even these cases involve interpretation, even though they involve
no interpretive discretion. Interpretation of a text does not only imply using judicial discretion
to choose between several possible meanings of the text. It also refers to the cognitive act of
making sense of a legal provision. This cognitive act is present even when the text is clear. It
only refers solely to the text and does not go to other alternative sources. See AHARON BARAK,
PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 49-51 (2003) (Hebrew). Furthermore, in order to
understand a part of the text, one must understand it as whole and comprehend its context, this
is an interpretive task. See Michael Waibel, Demystifying the Art of Interpretation 22 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 571, 577 (2011).
74. See Ulf Linderfalk, Is the Hierarchical Structure of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention Real or Not? Interpreting the Rules of Interpretation 54 NETHERLANDS INT’L L.
REV. 133, 141 (2007) (explaining the clear meaning doctrine and grounding the statement that
the Vienna Convention is committed to it in Article 33(4). This article refers to situations in
which the comparison of authentic treaty texts discloses a “difference of meaning which the
application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove.” This assumes that a difference in meaning
can be established even prior to the use of interpretative tools mentioned in the Convention).
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B. Ultra Vires Court Decisions
International courts are created by treaties—formal legal
documents agreed upon by states or international organizations. These
treaties set the limits to the courts’ authority. Any legal action that
directly digresses from the legal power of the court is illegitimate. A
possible way to view such an action is as a legal act done without
authority, which is known as an “ultra vires” act.75 This does not mean
courts cannot read legal provisions expansively within the boundaries
of the text. Courts, both national and international, do that all the time.76
However, a direct contradiction to the text authorizing the court is not
permitted.
Easy cases, by definition, are cases that leave no room for judicial
discretion. They are cases in which expansive interpretation is excluded
by the limits of the text. In these cases, judges cannot digress from the
text without committing an ultra vires act. A digression from a clear
text is not ultra vires because it is not the best representation of the will
or the interests of the parties to the treaty. The violation is far more
fundamental than that. It goes against the norm that authorizes the court
itself, namely the text of the relevant treaty.
Sometimes, the text is unclear and leaves room for several
potential interpretations. Nevertheless, even such a treaty may exclude
many interpretations as contradictory to the text itself. If the court opts
for an interpretation that directly contradicts the text, it would render
an illegitimate ultra vires judgment. 77
IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE CONSENT AND EXCEPTIONS TO
IT
Often the text of a treaty allows several potential interpretations.
Yet, judges cannot choose freely even within this limited set. Treaties
are supposed to reflect the will of the parties that consented to them.
Judges must respect the principle of state consent and interpret a treaty
in a way that concurs with the original intentions of the states that
75. Cf. EYAL BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 89-92 (2014) (discussing
the application of “ultra vires” as the basic doctrine of the rule of law to international
organizations and the problems this application raises). For the application of this, admittedly
unconventional, term to treaty interpretation by the ECHR, see Rudolf Bernhardt, Evolutive
Treaty Interpretation, Especially of the European Convention on Human Rights, 42 GERMAN
Y. B. INT’L L. 11, 24 (1999).
76. See Part II.B.1.
77. Cf. BARAK, supra note 71, at 35-41 (explaining the limitations on judicial discretion).
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signed it—namely, they should use the subjective approach to treaty
interpretation—unless there is good reason to digress from the states’
intentions.
The commitment of judges to state consent is not a strict rule.
Rather, it is a principle that is grounded in the notion that treaties
accurately represent the wishes of the states that negotiated them and
moreover, that these states are the best possible representatives of all
the individuals affected by the treaty. 78 Both of these presumptions are
often true, and they are essential to support a functioning international
system. Sometimes, however, these presumptions prove false.
A. Why Sometimes Treaties Do Not Represent the Will of States
Treaties do not always represent the will of states. Treaties are a
result of a complex process of collective bargaining between states with
conflicting interests. Some states may have a particularly strong
incentive to join a treaty regime for a host of reasons that have nothing
to do with commitment to fulfill the obligations in the treaty. 79 These
states are vulnerable to extortion by states which have less need for the
regime and therefore have a stronger bargaining power. Once the treaty
regime is in place, it can set mechanisms for its amendment that often
require the agreement of all parties. This gives parties that resist the
amendment—either because of its content or in order to extract
concessions from other states—a potent veto power. 80
The Convention results from power struggles among European
states—power struggles in which some states had an unfair

78. See Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Panos Merkouris, Canons of Treaty Interpretation:
Selected Case Studies from the World Trade Organization and the North American Free Trade
Agreement, in TREATY INTERPRETATION AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES: 30 YEARS ON 153, 156 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds., 2010) (articulating the view
of the International Law Commission that the text of treaties should be presumed to represent
the real intention of the parties).
79. See Eric Posner & Cass Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131,
165-66 (2006) (suggesting that states may join treaties because other states have pushed them to
do so or because they are offered some form of concession by other states). See generally Oona
A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 YALE L. J. 1935 (2002); Oona
A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U.
CHI. L. REV. 469 (2005) (exploring the reputational incentives of states to join treaties even if
they do not intend to comply with them).
80. See Dothan, supra note 9, at 517-18.
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advantage. 81 After the Convention was created, many states joined the
Convention without having any practical power to amend or update it.
The very notion of a treaty implies that states bind their future will
to the obligations that they previously assumed. If the state intends to
commit itself to a provision, the state should be bound by this provision
even if its interests change in the future and it wants to break this
commitment. In fact, scholars have argued that some states want to tie
their own hands in future cases not just as a concession to other states
in return for some form of payment, but mainly for internal purposes—
in order to prevent their future governments from damaging their longterm interests. 82 The intention that counts in this case is the one that
motivated the signature of the treaty to begin with. This intention
should guide the court as it interprets the treaty.
If, however, a state reluctantly accepts an obligation as part of the
process of give-and-take that leads to the treaty, one may ask if the
conclusion of this process—namely, the text of the treaty—accurately
reflects the will of all the states that participated in it. If the process
gives a clear edge to some states over others, the final text may not
reflect the wishes of most of the states that signed the treaty. A court
tasked with interpreting such a treaty is still constrained by the treaty’s
text. But when it comes to deciding between several options left open
by the text, the court should not assume that a restrictive interpretation
of the text accurately reflects the intentions of the states. Instead, the
court is allowed to interpret the treaty expansively.
Restrictive interpretation and expansive interpretation are both
legitimate means of interpretation, which are used by national and
international courts. 83 However, when the text of the treaty bears
81. See ED BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS—FROM ITS INCEPTION TO THE CREATION OF A PERMANENT COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
92–93, 95, 100 (2010) (explaining how the United Kingdom used its superior bargaining power
during the negotiations on the European Convention on Human Rights to create a much weaker
Convention than other states wanted).
82. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic
Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217 (2000) (arguing that states created the ECHR
specifically to “lock in” their democracies against future political forces); Beth A. Simmons &
Allison Danner, Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court, 64 INT’L ORG.
225 (2010) (arguing that some of the states that joined the jurisdiction of the ICC did so in order
to commit not to engage in war crimes).
83. See Christoph H Schreuer, The Interpretation of Treaties by Domestic Courts, 45 BRIT.
Y. B. INT’L L. 255, 299-301 (1971) (explaining that neither expansive—or so-called “effective”
interpretation—nor restrictive interpretation are a universal rule of international law. Domestic
courts in different legal systems prefer either one or the other).
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several potential interpretations, some of which create smaller
obligations on the states than others, the restrictive interpretation is the
one that minimizes the obligations of the states. Supporters of this
method suggest that it respects states’ sovereignty by requiring them to
fulfill only obligations they expressly agreed to. 84 The restrictive
interpretation therefore tracks the essence of the subjective approach to
treaty interpretation. 85
But if the obligations states took upon themselves expressly do
not reflect the intentions of many or most of the states that signed the
treaty, expansive interpretation should be preferred. In fact, expansive
interpretation may better match the wishes of most states when they
signed the treaty. At that point, states that have the least interest in the
treaty regime have the greatest bargaining power because they have a
credible threat to leave the negotiation table. This means that they can
limit the obligations mentioned in the treaty to the minimum, against
the interests of the majority of state parties.
By applying the principle of effectiveness, as shown in Part
II.B.1., the ECHR expands the obligations of states to more than the
text of the Convention strictly requires. 86 This allows the court to
follow what may have been the more generous intentions of many of
the Convention members, even if internal dynamics of negotiation led
to a much more restricted text. This is already the realm of teleological
interpretation, discussed in the next Part. Teleological interpretation
allows the court to overrule the intention of the parties as reflected in
what they actually agreed upon and substitute it with a deeper reading
of the purpose of the Convention.
After a treaty enters into force, states may be bound by its
provisions for many years. As years pass, material conditions and the
interests of states change. While a state may have favored a certain
provision when the treaty was negotiated, this provision may not be
suited to current circumstances a few years later. While many of the
states that signed the treaty may wish to amend it, the amendment
84. See Hersch Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness
in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 48, 58 (1949); IVAN. A. SHEARER,
STARKE’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 436-37 (11 ed., 1994).
85. Cf. Martin A. Rogoff, Interpretation of International Agreements by Domestic Courts
and the Politics of International Treaty Relations: Reflections on Some Recent Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 559, 568-69 (1996) (arguing, in
contrast, that restrictive interpretation and expansive interpretation are both compatible with all
the three approaches to the interpretation of treaties: textual, subjective, and teleological).
86. See supra Part II.B.1.

2019]

APPROACHES TO TREATY INTERPRETATION

785

process often requires a unanimous decision of all the states. A single
state may deliberately withhold its ratification to put pressure on
dozens of other states.
This, in fact, is exactly what Russia did when it refused to ratify
protocol 14 of the Convention for several years. All other forty-six
members of the Council of Europe already ratified this protocol, which
was essential to adapt the ECHR to current conditions. The will of all
the states of the Council of Europe was frustrated by the obstinacy of
one state that probably acted this way for political reasons. 87
The tool of evolutionary interpretation applied by the ECHR,
which is discussed in Part II.B.2., gives the ECHR the ability to adapt
treaties to current conditions. 88 This adaptation may track the wishes of
many states that joined the Convention years after it went into force.
Additionally, it may track the current views and practices of most
member states. Yet, again, this method of interpretation is better
viewed as teleological rather than subjective treaty interpretation.89
Instead of trying to track the actual intentions of the parties when they
signed the treaty, 90 the court is allowed to digress from that intention
and pursue the purpose of the treaty.
B. Why Sometimes States Do Not Represent All Individuals
The process of treaty negotiation is designed to allow states to
pursue their preferences. While this process may sometimes operate
imperfectly, it often works and makes the treaty the best possible
approximation of the collective will of the states. Nevertheless, this
Article argues that the ECHR should not be constrained to follow the

87. Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, implied that the Russian State Duma (lower
house of parliament) did not approve Protocol 14 because of the ECHR’s political decisions. See
BILL BOWRING, THE DEGRADATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER? THE
REHABILITATION OF LAW AND THE POSSIBILITY OF POLITICS 97 (2008).
88. See supra Part II.B.2.
89. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention
states that also “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation” shall be taken into account in interpretation.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969, 1980 U.N.T.S. 332.
This provision reflects a principle that is in tension with the “principle of contemporaneity”
according to which the terms of the treaty shall be interpreted according to their meaning when
the treaty was drafted. See MALGOSIA FITZMAURICE & OLUFEMI ELIAS, CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 219 (2005).
90. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 89, art. 31(4) (“A special
meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.”)
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intentions of the state parties even in cases in which the Convention
reflects exactly the wishes of all state parties.
But how can one be sure that the text of the Convention accurately
represents the wishes of all the parties that signed it? The unique
amendment mechanism of the Convention creates such a possibility.
While additional protocols that change the procedures of the
Convention vis-à-vis all member states must be approved by all states
of the Council of Europe—creating a veto power for each individual
state—states can also undertake to provide greater protection than the
Convention allows in a different type of additional protocols. This type
of additional protocols effectively functions as a separate treaty from
the Convention itself, a treaty which binds only the states that agreed
to ratify it. 91 An additional protocol will enter into force once the
conditions set by the states—usually ratification by a specified number
of states—are fulfilled. From that point on, any state that wishes to be
bound by the protocol can simply ratify it. 92 This clearly implies that a
state which did not join such a protocol made a conscious and
independent choice not to be bound by the additional obligations within
it. 93
Protocol 12, for example, is an additional protocol designed to
increase the obligations of ratifying states not to discriminate beyond
what the Convention requires. While article 14 of the Convention
protects the right of people only to enjoy their Convention rights
without discrimination, protocol 12 creates a general right to equality.
Although states that did not join protocol 12 decided against
committing not to discriminate in the granting of rights that do not fall
within the ambit of the Convention itself, the ECHR used interpretative
techniques to effectively eliminate this so-called “ambit requirement”
regarding certain social rights. For example, in an admissibility
decision in Stec v. United Kingdom (“Stec”), the ECHR decided that
social security payments, regardless of whether they are funded by
general taxation or by the beneficiaries, fall under the ambit of article
1, protocol 1 which protects the right to property. 94 Judge Borrego
Borrego explained in a concurring opinion to the Stec judgment, that
eventually found no violation, that by viewing property so expansively
91. DONNA GOMIEN, DAVID HARRIS & LEO ZWAAK, LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 18 (1996).
92. See Dothan, supra note 9, at 519.
93. Id.
94. Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2006-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶¶ 53-56.
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the ECHR effectively does away with the requirement that
discrimination should infringe another Convention right. 95 The ECHR
applied to the United Kingdom the heightened general obligation not
to discriminate enshrined in protocol 12, a protocol that the United
Kingdom chose not to ratify. 96
Judge Borrego Borrego is right that the ECHR sometimes
expansively interprets states’ Convention obligations even if the
Convention’s text fully matches the wishes of the state under
examination. Can this be legitimate? To answer that question, the
fundamental reason to respect state consent must be understood.
The principle of state consent that underlies the focus on the
intention of the parties derives from states’ sovereignty. It could be
further justified by the presumption that states are the best possible
representatives of all individuals affected by the treaty. It is the rights
of individual human beings which form the ultimate source of authority
of international courts. 97 As international judges exercise their judicial
discretion, the rights of all individuals should be their guide.
This does not imply that courts should ignore the decisions of
states. There is no global democratic organization, and states represent
their citizens better than any other political body. 98 Yet sometimes
states are susceptible to democratic failures—situations in which the
state probably misrepresents the rights of individuals affected by its
actions. International courts cannot investigate whether the actions of
the state do indeed go against the interests of individuals in specific
cases. Instead, in situations that are prone to democratic failures, courts
should be willing to ignore the intentions of the state and prefer a
method of interpretation that effectively protects the rights of all
individuals involved.
The most evident democratic failure appears in situations in which
the actions of a state have implications for other states. In a heavily
populated world equipped with modern technology, more and more
state actions impinge on other states. Examples include air and water
pollution as well as depletion of natural resources. 99 States should not

95. Id. (concurring opinion of judge Borrego Borrego).
96. Stec v. United Kingdom (GC), App. No. 65731/01, 2006-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 131 (2006).
97. See BOGDANDY & VENZKE, supra note 10, at 210-13.
98. Id. at 212-13.
99. See e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability
of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AMER. J. INT’L L. 295, 295-98 (2013); Eyal Benvenisti,
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be allowed to jeopardize the interests of other states and their citizens
by their treaty obligations. 100 If an international court has reason to
believe that a treaty affects the citizens of states that are not party to it,
the court should be allowed to interpret the treaty in a way that does
not concur with the interests of the state parties.
Furthermore, in a globalized market, multinational companies can
make states compete for their favors and take advantage of the states’
inability to act collectively. This means that states that act in isolation
may not even serve the best interests of their own citizens. 101 Scholars
have argued that the ECHR should be aware of these problems and
determine the deference it grants to states according to their ability to
properly represent all the affected interests. 102 Treaty interpretation can
also act as a tool in this regard, allowing the ECHR to use its
interpretative discretion in ways that accommodate interests that states
failed to account for.
Additionally, states are sometimes home to individuals who are
formally excluded from the democratic process, such as residents who
are not citizens and, in some states, also prisoners whose right to vote
has been suspended or annulled. 103 Courts should be willing to protect
the rights of these individuals against encroachment by their states104
and can read treaties expansively to do so.
Some groups formally take part in the democratic process but,
because of imperfections in this process, have a disproportionately
small effect on decision-making within their state. A prominent
example are so-called “discrete and insular minorities”—small groups
which suffer from discrimination that prevents them from closing

The Margin of Appreciation, Subsidiarity and Global Challenges to Democracy, 9 J. INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT 240, 245 (2018).
100. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 89, art. 34 (noting that a
treaty cannot create an obligation on a third state without its consent).
101. See Benvenisti, The Margin of Appreciation, Subsidiarity and Global Challenges to
Democracy, supra note 99, at 247-49.
102. Id. at 251-52.
103. See generally Shai Dothan, Comparative Views on the Right to Vote in International
Law: The Case of Prisoners’ Disenfranchisement, in COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW 379
(Anthea Roberts et al. eds., 2018) (surveying different legal solutions regarding the voting rights
of prisoners in different states).
104. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST – A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 161 (1980).
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political deals. 105 These groups may be excluded from the political
game and have only a minor effect on the policy of their states.106
Sometimes, it is the wider segments of society, not minorities,
which are the most vulnerable. 107 People who are not members of
distinct interest groups face great difficulties when they want to inform
themselves about the actions of their representatives. 108 These people
can hardly coordinate their actions with members of their diffused
social groups in ways that can affect political decision-makers because
every member of their group has only a minor interest in the success of
the group as a whole. 109 Small interest groups can benefit themselves
at the expense of these wider groups that cannot come together and
defend their interests. These interest groups may also possess greater
access to processes of international negotiation, allowing them to shape
treaties according to their interests. 110
When rights of non-voters, minorities, or large and disorganized
social groups are at stake, courts should be willing to disregard the
intention of the parties in favor of expansive interpretations that protect
these rights. If the rights of vulnerable groups are protected by the
court, this can serve as a substitute for real political influence. The
interests of disadvantaged group members can be safeguarded by
setting them as equal to those of all other members of society. Scholars
have named this type of right protection “Virtual Representation.” 111
C. Digressing from the Principle of State Consent
When there is no reason to doubt that the treaty represents the will
of the state whose obligations the court is circumscribing and the
individuals affected by these obligations, the court should follow the
subjective approach to treaty interpretation—it should solve
105. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
106. Id.
107. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 724
(1985).
108. See Susanne Lohmann, An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests,
92 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 809, 812 (1998).
109. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 33-34 (1965). Cf.
GUNNAR TRUMBULL, STRENGTH IN NUMBERS: THE POLITICAL POWER OF WEAK INTERESTS
(2012) (arguing that in advanced democracies diffuse interests can actually significantly impact
policy-making).
110. See Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV.
167, 184-86 (1999).
111. See ELY, supra note 104, at 76-84.
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ambiguities in the text in light of the intention of the parties to the
treaty. This implies interpreting the treaty restrictively so that states
will not be liable for anything that they did not expressly consent to.
In contrast, when the court has reason to suspect that the treaty
does not represent the will of the state in question or that this state
misrepresents certain individuals, the court should ignore the intention
of the parties and use the teleological method of interpretation to
expand the state’s obligations, within the zone of discretion allowed by
the treaty’s text.
The instruction to ignore the intention of the parties in some
situations does not contradict the principle of state consent. Instead, it
represents an attempt to follow its underlying justification. The
principle of state consent should still instruct courts. It should guide
them to follow the intention of the parties in some situations. But when
the ultimate justification for this principle—namely the presumption
that it serves the interests of all affected individuals 112—is undermined,
the principle should give way to its own justification and the
teleological interpretation mandated by it. 113
V. THE PURPOSE OF TREATIES
When the court is tasked with interpreting an ambiguous treaty
and it has reason to believe that the text as it stands does not reflect the
will of all the people affected by the treaty, it must turn to the object
and purpose of the treaty. In other words, the court must apply the
teleological approach to treaty interpretation.
The purpose of the treaty can be learned from the text of the treaty
and from the intentions of the state parties to it. 114 A teleological
reading of the treaty must seek not only the direct wishes of the parties
but also more abstract goals they set for the treaty regime as a whole.115
In addition, the court should consider the object of the treaty as it
112. See supra 97 and accompanying text.
113. Cf. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 230 (1991)
(suggesting that rules sometimes operate as presumptions: they direct behavior unless their
underlying justifications clearly do not hold. The existence of a rule in these cases saves the
effort of trying to check if the justifications apply in all cases in which there is no good reason
to suspect that they do not apply).
114. See AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 183-84 (2004) (describing a
similar method of purposive interpretation in domestic law).
115. Id.
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stands: what hypothetical will could motivate such a treaty if all
relevant interests were taken into account? The object of the treaty must
be considered in varying degrees of abstraction. 116 Ultimately, the
object of the treaty is to serve the interests of all individuals affected
by it. 117
Many times, when courts refer to the purpose of the treaty, they
interpret it expansively. There is a close connection between the
principle of effectiveness—calling on the interpreter to give real effect
to the rights protected by the treaty—and teleological interpretation.118
Teleological interpretation allows the judge to read expansively the
obligations of states to individuals while at the same time restricting
the scope of the limitations on these obligations and any reservations
from them. 119
Teleological interpretation is also naturally connected to
evolutionary interpretation that allows the meaning of the treaty to
develop and change over time. While the text of the treaty and the will
of the parties are relatively fixed, the object of the treaty, especially in
high levels of abstraction, is malleable and can transform to suit new
conditions. 120
International courts have usually opted for expansive treaty
interpretation instead of restrictive treaty interpretation. This tendency
is already visible in the Permanent Court of International Justice
(“PCIJ”) and the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). 121 It is evident
in the practice of the ECHR, which uses a variety of interpretative
techniques to enhance the protection of human rights in the
Convention. 122
This tendency is hardly surprising. The ECHR is tasked with
interpreting a vague law-making treaty that was created to support a
human rights regime across many decades. Therefore, the text of the
116. Id.
117. See BOGDANDY & VENZKE, supra note 10, at 48 (explaining that international courts
have to take into account the interests and values of the international community as a whole
when they adjudicate).
118. See Christoph Schreuer, Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in
Investment Arbitration, in TREATY INTERPRETATION AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES: 30 YEARS ON (Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds., 2010) 129, 132 (suggesting
that methods of interpretation that refer to the object and purpose of the treaty usually lead to
results that favor the effectiveness of the treaty in investment treaty arbitration tribunals).
119. See Dothan, supra note 29, at 131.
120. See id.
121. See Lauterpacht, supra note 84, at 51, 67.
122. See supra Part II.B1.
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Convention cannot be the only guide of the judges. The power struggles
that led to the creation of the Convention, the fact that it was joined by
many states who had no practical ability to determine its content, and
the veto power given to current members against amendment suggest
that the intentions of the parties cannot be relied upon to interpret the
Convention in many cases.
Furthermore, many of the individuals affected by the Convention
are practically excluded from the political process. They include
foreigners, 123 prisoners, 124 ethnic minorities such as the Roma,125 and
wide segments of the public that enjoy welfare benefits but cannot
effectively organize to lobby for their rights. 126 In these situations, the
court cannot follow only the intention of the parties. It must turn to
teleological interpretation and expand the obligations of the states,
making the Convention an effective and up-to-date tool for protecting
human rights. The practice of the ECHR—that uses expansive
interpretation very often to defend such vulnerable groups—is
therefore normatively justified. 127
VI. BETWEEN THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION AND TREATY
INTERPRETATION
The Margin of Appreciation directs the ECHR to defer to some of
the policy decisions of the states in Europe and not to find them in
violation of the Convention. 128 A potential justification for the
123. For examples of judgments protecting foreigners, see Case of Othman (Abu Qatada)
v. The United Kingdom, 2012-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 159 (preventing an attempt to deport an extremist
Muslim cleric to Jordan because his trial there may include testimonies taken under torture); A.
A. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8000/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011) (preventing the deportation of a
Nigerian rapist because he formed social connections in the United Kingdom).
124. For examples for judgments protecting prisoners, see Hirst v. United Kingdom (No.
2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187 (deciding that a general ban on prisoners’ right to vote violates
their Convention rights); Greens and MT v. United Kingdom, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 57 (a “Pilot
Judgment” giving the United Kingdom six months to comply with the Hirst judgment).
125. As an example for a judgment protecting the Roma minority, see D.H. and Others v.
Czech Republic, 2007-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 241 (ruling that Roma children suffer from
discrimination because they are disproportionately more likely to be sent to special schools with
an inferior teaching level).
126. For an example of a case which considers the importance of protecting the large
segments of society that enjoy social security benefits, see Stec & Others v. the United Kingdom,
2006-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, para. 53-56 (deciding, as explained in Part IV.B, that social security
payments, whether funded by taxation or directly by the benefactors, are covered by Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which protects the right to property).
127. See supra notes 123-26.
128. See supra Part II.B.4.
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deference granted to these states is that the ECHR is not a
democratically elected body, while states in Europe are democracies.129
Usually, the ECHR should rely on the internal democratic process
within the states as the best possible safeguard for the rights of
individuals.
But scholars have argued that this cannot always be the case. In
cases of potential democratic failures, the Margin of Appreciation is
unjustified and should not be respected. 130 Scholars have even argued
that the ECHR does in fact consider the democratic credentials of states
when it sets the limits of the Margin of Appreciation, applying stricter
scrutiny to situations in which the state may not effectively represent
the rights of its citizens. 131
The parallel between the three-stage approach to treaty
interpretation presented here and this conception of the Margin of
Appreciation should be clear by now. The Margin of Appreciation is
relevant when the text of the treaty leaves room for interpretation. 132 It
directs the court to consider the policies of states for the same reason
that courts should usually follow the intention of state parties to
international treaties—namely, states’ ability to represent the interests
of their citizens. However, when states are susceptible to democratic
failures, the ECHR should use expansive interpretation and narrow the
Margin of Appreciation given to the states. This final move often goes
hand in hand with the use of teleological interpretation. The nature of
the issues that the ECHR deals with guarantees that the court will
frequently reach this final stage of interpretation. Indeed, the court uses
many interpretive techniques to effectively protect human rights in
Europe, despite the inevitable encroachment on states’ sovereignty. 133
VII. CONCLUSION
The Margin of Appreciation, like the intentions of the parties to
the Convention, forms a constraint on the discretion of the ECHR.
Within the boundaries of the Convention’s text, ECHR judges must
consider these constraints out of deference to the will of European
states. Yet these constraints are flexible. Sometimes the court has
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See Shany, supra note 13, at 919-21.
See Benvenisti, supra note 15, at 849, 853.
See supra note 16.
See supra Part II.B.4.
See Dothan, supra note 9, at 512-16.
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reason to believe that problems of collective bargaining or democratic
failures render the intentions of state parties or their current policies
inadequate approximations of the interests of all people involved. In
these cases, the ECHR should digress from these constraints.
This Article highlighted that as the ECHR turns away from the
intentions of the state parties and ignores the Margin of Appreciation,
it usually follows teleological interpretation. As the court seeks to
construe the purpose of the Convention, a potential guide is the current
policies adopted by the majority of the states in Europe—the so-called
“Emerging Consensus.” 134 Following the policies that most European
states adopt and enforcing them on the minority of deviant states may
track the hypothetical objective meaning of the treaty—the
interpretation that reflects the best balance of all relevant rights and
interests—and serve its purpose.
Here is why: If every state tries to adopt the best policy to suit its
own citizens, it uses its decision-making ability to make a calculated
and independent decision. The Condorcet Jury theorem suggests that
tracking the majority within a group of independent decision-makers is
likely to lead to a better decision than each decision-maker could make
on her own. 135 Therefore, when the ECHR tracks the current views of
most European states by using the Emerging Consensus doctrine, it
uses a mechanism that can lead to the best possible interpretation of the
Convention, considering all the interests involved. 136 When the states
forfeit their Margin of Appreciation, the ECHR often follows Emerging
Consensus, 137 thereby fulfilling the purpose of the Convention. 138

134. See Shai Dothan, Three Interpretive Constraints on the European Court of Human
Rights, in THE RULE OF LAW AT THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS:
CONTESTATIONS AND DEFERENCE 227 (Machiko Kanetake & André Nollkaemper eds. 2016).
135. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 79 (2006) (using the Condorcet Jury theorem to
justify the use of comparative law).
136. See Shai Dothan, The Optimal Use of Comparative Law, 43 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y. 21 (2014) (applying the Condorcet Jury Theorem to justify the Emerging Consensus
doctrine as a method that leads to good policies, while stressing that international courts like the
ECHR are at a better institutional position to use this tool than national courts).
137. See Helfer, supra note 46.
138. See Shai Dothan, Judicial Deference Allows European Consensus to Emerge, 18 CHI.
J. INT’L L. 392 (2018) (explaining that a correct application of the Margin of Appreciation
doctrine can allow the ECHR to apply Emerging Consensus in a way that maximizes the
decisional advantages of the Condorcet Jury Theorem).

